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　This past January 2016 North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear 
test. Undoubtedly, Pyongyang’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons 
development poses critical problems on multiple fronts.
　First of all, it represents a major threat to the peace and stability 
on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia at large. All of North 
Korea’s regional neighbors have expressed that they cannot accept 
a nuclear-armed DPRK. Their support of the latest round of UN 
sanctions is a clear message to North Korea that its adherence to the 
nuclear program is not a viable option. They all call for a nuclear 
1  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Symposium 
Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of SUPRI, Soka University, Japan 
on May 21, 2016.  This work was supported by Kyungnam University 
Foundation Grant, 2015.
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free Korean Peninsula; anything less is unacceptable. Ultimately, a 
nuclear North Korea threatens the global nonproliferation regime 
and regional security.
　North Korea’s nuclear capability is a potential factor for a regional 
arms buildup. For instance, we have seen that North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons development has emboldened South Korean hardliners 
to raise the once taboo question of whether South Korea should 
build its own nuclear arsenal. 
2
North Korea’s fourth nuclear test has 
rekindled the debate. 
3
North Korea’s growing capability, coupled with 
uncertainty about the strength of US extended deterrence in Asia, has 
evoked similar sentiments in Japan.

　The most recent nuclear test also led Seoul and Washington to 
launch formal talks in March and later officially agree in July to 
deploy THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile defense 
system on South Korean soil, citing North Korea’s growing nuclear 
and ballistic missile capabilities as the reason and shrugging off 
the strong protest of China and Russia, who view the deployment 
as aimed at them. 
5
Furthermore, the US and ROK held their largest 
2　 Barbara Demick, “More South Koreans Support Developing Nuclear 
Weapons,” LA Times, March 18, 2013. 
3　 Robert Kelly, “South Korea’s Nuclear Temptation,” The Diplomat, March 1, 
2016; Gordon G. Chang, “Will South Korea Rethink Its Nuke Policy?” World 
Affairs Journal, January 12, 2016.
4　Danielle Demetriou, “Japan ‘Should Develop Nuclear Weapons’ to 
Counter North Korea Threat,” Telegraph, April 20, 2009; Eric Johnson, 
“Osaka Governor Says Japan Should Debate Need for Nuclear Weapons,” 
Japan Times, March 30, 2016; Admiral Dennis Blair and General Masayuki 
Hironaka, “The North Korean Nuclear Test and the US-Japan Alliance,” 
The Diplomat, January 24, 2016.
5　Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korea and U.S. Agree to Deploy Missile Defense 
System,” New York Times, July 7, 2016; Jack Kim, “South Korea, U.S. to 
Deploy THAAD Missile Defense, Drawing China Rebuke,” Reuters, July 8, 
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ever annual joint military exercises this past spring―an operation 
that Pyongyang interpreted as “nuclear war moves.” 
6
Indeed, recent 
reports question whether the nuclear great powers themselves―
that is, China, Russia, and the US－aren’t already in a “Cold War-like 
spiral” toward a “second nuclear age” as they race to develop more 
sophisticated nuclear arms. 
7
North Korea’s own nuclear-weapons 
pursuit will only serve to increase hardline attitudes, exacerbate 
regional tensions, heighten fears in Seoul and Tokyo, and fuel Cold 
War tendencies.
　Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons ambitions serve as a structural 
barrier to improvement in inter-Korean relations. South Korea has 
condemned North Korea’s nuclear tests since the first one was 
conducted in October 2006. For the incumbent administration in 
Seoul, North Korea’s willingness toward denuclearization has been 
made a precondition to improved inter-Korean relations that have 
already been severely damaged during the previous Lee Myung-bak 
administration. Seoul’s current policy toward the North, its so-called 
“trust-building process,” has promised improvement in relations 
between the two Koreas; but the policy is said to be “built on a solid 
2016. Despite the public outcry in South Korea―as approximately half the 
population is opposed to the deployment―the South Korean government 
later announced that the anti-missile battery system would be staged in 
the vicinity of the southeastern county of Seongju and be operational by 
the end of 2017. See Jack Kim and Ju-min Park, “South Korea chooses 
site of THAAD U.S. missile system amid protests,” Reuters, July 13, 2016; 
Charlie Campbell, “Backlash Over THAAD Shows Why the Kim Clan 
Have Terrorized North Korea for So Long,” Time, July 15, 2016.
6  Reuters, “South Korea, U.S. begin exercises as North Korea Threatens 
Attack,” March 7, 2016.
7  William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Race for the Latest Class of 
Nuclear Arms Threatens to Revise Cold War,” New York Times, April 16, 
2016.
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foundation of security” to “deter North Korea provocations based on 
strong deterrence,” with Seoul encouraging Pyongyang to “scrap its 
nuclear program and abide by international norms and obligations.” 
8
It is predicated on the position that Pyongyang first must show its 
sincerity for denuclearization. Intrinsically, that means halting all 
nuclear testing―as such is seen as a grave provocation and threat 
to peace on the peninsula―and return to the Six-Party Talks, the 
multilateral forum established to negotiate a peaceful solution to the 
nuclear issue.
　North Korea’s continued nuclear pursuit stands as an impediment 
to the country’s economic development. Its nuclear testing has 
only served to increase the severity of international and bilateral 
sanctions against the country, thus negatively impacting its trade, 
and furthering Pyongyang’s diplomatic and economic isolation. 
The latest round of UN sanctions―that is, UN Security Council 
Resolution 2270―is illustrative of this. Indeed, North Korea’s ability to 
attract significant foreign investment and earn hard currency for its 
economic development will prove illusive unless provocations cease 
and genuine progress is made in negotiating a solution to the nuclear 
issue. 
Where Do We Stand?
　To understand the nuclear issue, we must go back to early 1990s―
the advent of “the first nuclear crisis” on the Korean peninsula. In the 
wake of the collapse of the communist bloc in the early 1990s, loss 
8  Ministry of Unification, “Trust Building Process on the Korean Peninsula,” 
September 2013, http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1920&mode
=view&page=&cid=32799. 
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of North Korea’s system of preferential barter trade, and uncertainty 
of security support from its traditional allies, North Korea’s threat 
perception peaked. Seoul had normalized relations with its Cold 
War adversaries, China and Russia; but Pyongyang failed to do the 
same with its enemies, the US and Japan. Isolated and growing more 
insecure, North Korea decided to ‘go-it-alone’. Overwhelmed by the 
“hostile policy” of a military super-power, it has adopted a kind of 
balancing strategy of its own against the United States by posing 
asymmetrical challenges and threats. 
9
　After IAEA inspectors found “discrepancies” in North Korea’s 1992 
nuclear materials declaration, special inspections of DPRK facilities 
were demanded in February 1993. North Korea refused. Pyongyang 
announced its intent to withdraw from the NPT―which it had only 
officially ascended to a year earlier. Over the next year and a half, 
the situation would spiral downward to the point where President Bill 
Clinton entertained the idea of a surgical strike on the North Korean 
nuclear facilities in the spring of 1994. Former President Jimmy 
Carter’s trip to Pyongyang in June that year stopped the attack and 
instead his discussions with Kim Il Sung helped to confirm a “freeze” 
of North Korea’s nuclear programs―and in the process prevent UN 
sanctions and avert a war. Despite Kim Il Sung’s sudden death in 
July, four months of bilateral US-DPRK negotiations would lead to the 
“Geneva Agreed Framework” of October 1994, a bilateral agreement 
to halt North Korea’s nuclear programs. The agreement also called 
for movement toward full normalization of US-DPRK political and 
economic relations.
　Improvements in the security environment would follow for the 
9　Kyung-Ae Park, “North Korean Strategies in the Asymmetric Nuclear 
Conflict with the United States,” Asian Perspective 34:1 (2010), pp. 11-47.
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next eight years primarily because of the engagement policy taken 
by two liberal administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun 
in Seoul. Most significant would be the improvement in inter-Korean 
relations, highlighted by the first ever inter-Korean summit held in 
June 2000. The Geneva Agreement has been, slow and rocky it may 
be, implemented with collective support by the US, South Korea and 
even Japan. 
　But after the advent of the George Bush administration in 2001, 
lack of commitment and bad faith on both sides―that is, between 
Pyongyang and Washington―would lead to the collapse of the 
Agreed Framework. The collapse has turned out to be a major blow 
to denuclearization of North Korea.
　In October 2002, the nuclear issue resurfaced after allegations 
and controversy over North Korea’s possession of a clandestine 
uranium enrichment program. US/IAEA accusations and Pyongyang’s 
refusals―over not only its nuclear but also missile programs―would 
subsequently lead to North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in 
January 2003. 
　Turbulence in the NEA security environment would ensue. 
Eventually, in August 2003, a six-party negotiation framework, the Six-
Party Talks(6PT), was formed to specifically deal with the security 
concerns created by the nuclear issue. This included all relevant 
parties: the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia. 
　Over the following two years, despite hiatuses and diverging 
interests, the 6PTwould make progress, most notably during the fourth 
round of talks and signing of the “September 19 joint statement” in 
2005. 
　But this, too, came to a critical juncture in October 2006 when 
North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. International sanctions 
THE DPRK NUCLEAR ISSUE AFTER THE FOURTH TEST 25
ensued. But the parties committed to diplomacy to resolve the 
impasse, generating positive momentum to resume talks. Talks in 
February 2007 culminated in the signing of a detailed “action plan” for 
all parties to move the peninsular denuclearization efforts forward, 
including by means of five issue-specific Working Groups. The 
subsequent constructive bilateral consultations and coordination 
helped build confidence among the actors, and in particular helped 
repair bones of contention (that is, the Banco Delta Asia issue) that 
obstructed further progress from being made. 
　A second inter-Korean summit was held in October 2007, which 
coincided with 6PT negotiations. The contents and outcomes of the 
summit suggested Pyongyang’s awareness that expanding inter-
Korean economic relations, as well as putting an enduring peace 
framework in place, is based on North Korea’s own commitment to 
resolving the nuclear issue.
　But eventually unsatisfactory North Korean declarations, delays in 
agreed upon energy assistance, and failure to reach an agreement on 
verification, inter alia, would bring the 6PT to a stalemate. The 6PT has 
not convened since December 2008 and has been suspended since 
April 2009. 
　Since then, North Korea has conducted tests of nuclear explosive 
devices in May 2009, February 2013, and January 2016. Its nuclear-
bomb making capability has increased. Notably its uranium 
enrichment facilities―as revealed in November 2010  
10
―and ability to 
produce weapons-grade plutonium has been augmented. Pyongyang 
claims to have tested a thermonuclear device this past January. The 
10 Siegfried S. Hecker, “A Return Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear 
Complex,” NAPSNet Special Report, Nautilus Institute, November 22, 
2010.
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North Korean leader reportedly seeks to boost the country’s nuclear 
arsenal for deterrent purposes.  
11
 North Korea has stated it intends 
to improve the “quality and quantity” of its nuclear stockpile―
assessed to be between 10 to 16 bombs, and estimated to be capable 
of producing 100 by 2020.  
12
 Likewise, its missile programs―also a grave 
threat to regional security―have seen significant upgrading and 
expansion over these years.  
13
 This includes technical advancements 
to mount nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles.  
14
 One can only 
speculate that the North Korean regime will continue to strengthen 
the country’s nuclear weapons capabilities. 
　Predictably, the fourth nuclear test brought about condemnation 
from the international community. As a consequence we have 
seen active diplomacy by South Korea and the members of the UN 
Security Council. The outcome has been the UNSC’s adoption of 
Resolution 2270 on March 2, which brings down the most stringent 
sanctions to date against the DPRK.  
15
　Even North Korea’s lone ally, China, has shown active diplomacy 
in this regard. Beijing helped to negotiate with Washington the latest 
UNSC resolution. And on the sideline of the recent nuclear security 
summit in Washington, US president Barack Obama and Chinese 
president Xi Jinping expressed a “commitment to the denuclearization 
of the Korean Peninsula and full implementation of U.N. sanctions,” 
11 “Kim Jong Un Guides Work for Increasing Nuclear Arsenal,” KCNA, 
March 9, 2016.
12 Joel S. Wit and Sun Young Ahn, “North Korea’s Nuclear Futures: 
Technology and Strategy,” US-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2015.
13 Ibid.
14 “Kim Jong Un Guides Work for Mounting Nuclear Warheads on Ballistic 
Rockets,” KCNA, March 9, 2016.
15 For the UNSC members’ statements and contents of UNSC Resolution 
2270, see http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12267.doc.htm.
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and that they will “enhance communication and coordination on the 
Korea nuclear issue.”  
16
Will Sanctions Work?
　The big question is, will the latest round of sanctions work?
　Over the years we have seen numerous UN sanctions adopted 
following North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations. 
　Yet there are no signs that the sanctions policy has been effective. 
Many analysts argued that sanctions don’t work.  Due to North 
Korea’s economic isolation, stiffer sanctions are unlikely to have 
the desired effect.  In fact, even under sanctions, the North Korean 
economy has shown improvement and plus growth rates.  Obviously, 
there are many ways that North Korea evades sanctions.  
UN Security Council Resolutions (2006 ～ 2016)
S/RES/1695 (July 15, 2006) Condemned North Korea’s 2006 launch of 
ballistic missiles and imposed sanctions.
S/RES/1718 (October 14, 2006) Expressed concern over North 
Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, imposed sanctions and set up the 
Sanctions Committee.
S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009) Expressed concern over North Korea’s 
2009 nuclear test. Extended sanctions to concern all arms material 
and related financial transactions, technical training, advice, 
services or assistance, manufacture and maintenance. Set up the 
Panel of Experts to assist the Sanctions Committee. 
16 “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People’s Republic 
of China before Bilateral Meeting,” The White House, March 31, 2016.
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S/RES/1887 (September 24, 2009) Called for implementing the UNSC 
Resolution 1540 for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. 
S/RES/1928 (June 7, 2010) Extended the mandate of the Panel of 
Experts until 12 June 2011.
S/RES/1985 (June 10, 2011) Extended the mandate of the Panel of 
Experts until 12 June 2012 and asked it to submit its midterm and 
final reports to the Sanctions Committee for discussion one month 
before they are submitted to the Security Council. 
S/RES/2050 (June 12, 2012) Extended the mandate of the Panel of 
Experts until 12 June 2013.
S/RES/2087 (January 22, 2013) Condemned North Korea’s 2012 
satellite launch and added to sanctions. 
S/RES/2094 (March 7, 2013) Imposed sanctions after North Korea’s 
2013 nuclear test. 7 March 2013
S/RES/2141 (March 5, 2014) Extended the mandate of the Panel of 
Experts until 5 April 2015.
S/RES/2207 (March 4, 2015) Extended the mandate of the Panel of 
Experts until 5 April 2016.
S/RES/2270 (March 2, 2016) Imposed sanctions after North Korea’s 
2016 nuclear and missile tests. Sanctions include inspection of all 
passing cargo to and from North Korea, prohibition of all weapons 
trade with the country, additional restrictions on North Korean 
imports of luxury goods, and expulsion of certain North Korean 
diplomats suspected of illicit activities.
　The most recent UN sanctions, brought down in March 2016 via 
adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2270, are supposedly 
more stringent than ever. It expands the scope of existing sanctions. 
However, as always, UN member-states’ compliance with the sanctions 
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will determine the effectiveness of the expanded scope.
　Many countries also have implemented bilateral sanctions against 
the DPRK, including the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, 
the EU, and South Korea, among others, as they view North Korea’s 
nuclear programs as a global security and proliferation threat.  
17
 But 
North Korea has been under unilaterally-imposed US embargos and 
various sanctions since the Korean War (1950). They have dealt with 
sanctions for decades.
　Recently, the ROK government has demonstrated an “all-in” 
approach to sanctions. In February Seoul shut down the last 
remaining major inter-Korean cooperation project, the Kaesong 
Industrial Complex. Obviously, the aim is to stop inflow of hard 
currency into Pyongyang and to force North Korea to capitulate or 
face economic collapse.
　China’s position―that is, “sanction is not the goal”, but rather “an 
instrument for non-nuclearization”―diverges from the US and South 
Korean sanctions only position. China has been reluctant to use 
trade leverage against North Korea, for various reasons, but partly 
because Beijing fears such might set off the collapse of the regime in 
the DPRK and cause regional instability. China has over these years 
taken the position of “stability first” on the Korean peninsula.  Indeed, 
Article 49 and 50 of UNSC Resolution 2270 emphasize the “importance 
of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in 
Northeast Asia at large, and expresses its commitment to a peaceful, 
diplomatic and political solution to the situation,” while reaffirming 
17 For example, see the US Office of Foreign Assets Control’s current 
sanctions against the DPRK. OFAC, “North Korea Sanctions Program,” 
June 3, 2015. https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/
Programs/Documents/nkorea.pdf
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support of the 6PT and “the commitments set forth in the Joint 
Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States, 
including that the goal of the 6PT is the verifiable denuclearization 
of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, that the United States 
and the DPRK undertook to respect each other’s sovereignty and exist 
peacefully together, and that the Six Parties undertook to promote 
economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments.” China’s 
strong support for the 6PT and for the implementation of ‘September 
19 joint statement’ are reflected in the newest UNSC resolution.
　The big picture suggests that a heavy sanctions policy has failed in 
the past to bring about the desired change in North Korea’s behavior. 
This time, once again there are noticeable limitations to sanctions, 
especially in terms of implementation.  
18
 What is more, sanctions tend 
to lead to adaptation and further provocative actions by North Korea, 
trapping us in a vicious cycle: that is, North Korea’s provocative 
action, followed by international sanctions, followed by Pyongyang’s 
opposition and further provocations, more sanctions, etc. Sanctions 
alone do not seem to be the answer.
How to Resume Six Party Talks
　To resolve the nuclear issue, North Korea must be brought back 
to the dialogue table―specifically, the Six-Party Talks. Indeed Article 
50 of the Resolution 2270 reassures support of the 6PT.  Then how to 
resume the 6PT is the real question that faces all concerned parties in 
Northeast Asia.
18 Andrea Berger, “The 2016 UN Panel of Experts Report: An Eye-Opening 
Account of Persistent Blindness,” 38 North, April 19, 2016.
THE DPRK NUCLEAR ISSUE AFTER THE FOURTH TEST 31
　Criticized in the past as a “crisis management mechanism,” 
the 6PT process, like other multilateral efforts, has its flaws and 
vulnerabilities. It isn’t perfect.
　But up to this point in time, the 6PT is the only venue to deal with 
the DPRK nuclear issue. It has shown value and utility. Critics may 
ask, “How so?” Well, while the six-party process was working, we did 
not see repeated provocations from North Korea. Also, the September 
2005 Joint Statement is the most comprehensive security cooperation 
charter  that the parties to the talks have agreed upon, establishing a 
foundation in which to resume dialogue. 
　Following North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, there has been a 
renewed consensus on the value of the 6PT. But to get North Korea 
to the talks, preconditions of “denuclearization first”―however 
desirable―are not likely to move the North Koreans toward dialogue. 
Pyongyang’s security concerns will have to be addressed, as the 
Chinese government repeatedly emphasized.
　In this context, China put forth a new proposal that we start a 
simultaneous dialogue process that discusses ‘non-nuclearization’ 
of the Korean Peninsula and a ‘peace agreement’ to end the Korean 
War. In particular, progress needs to be made on a peace agreement. 
Offering to commence dialogue on the issue could be put forward as 
an incentive to bring North Korea back to the 6PT process.
　Unquestionably, however, getting North Korea back to the 6PT will 
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be a herculean challenge, as Pyongyang views the talks as “dead.”  
19
At this stage, it might be premature to resume this forum. Unless 
certain preconditions are met by the DPRK, the 6PT is unlikely to be 
resumed. 
　Under the current long stalemate, the 6PT will need to take a 
minimalist approach, that is, to set its goal lower. DPRK’s moratorium 
on the nuclear and missile firing tests in return for a nominal US 
humanitarian aid that the United States and North Korea have 
formulated and agreed in 2012 may be a useful reference. The urgent 
task may be to stop leaving North Korean nuclear programs free-
floating. The DPRK nuclear program needs to be put under some 
kind of international control in order to end the current negligence 
of the problem. If not, and we continue on the current course, North 
Korea will carry on with its nuclear ambitions and tests.
19 Reportedly, Choe Son Hui, the North Korean delegate to the 26th 
Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) held June 22-23, 2016, 
said during the closed-door session that “six party talks are dead” and 
also reiterated Pyongyang’s position that North Korea will never give up 
its nuclear deterrent unless the “entire world abandons nuclear weapons.” 
Since the suspension of the 6PT in December 2008, the NEACD―a Track 
II gathering―is the only mechanism that brings nuclear envoys from 
the 6PT countries to one table. North Korea did not participate in the 
dialogue in 2014 and 2015. Elizabeth Shim, “North Korea says six-party 
talks on denuclearization are 'dead',” UPI, June 22, 2016.
